2027: No shaking, says Atiku over Court Judgment stopping him as ADC Presidential Candidate

Former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar and presidential candidate of African Democratic Congress (ADC) has reacted to a court judgment removing the David Mark-led leadership of the party, describing it as “politically-motivated”.

A statement ​‌‌​‍‌‍⁠⁠‍‌⁠‍⁠⁠‌‌‌‌​issued by Phrank Shaibu, ADC-PCC campaign spokesperson on Thursday in Abuja, said the ruling was aimed at “weakening the party”.

Atiku questioned the judgment’s timing, coming barely a day after he was welcomed by party supporters in Sokoto.

“The people of Sokoto came out in their thousands because they are hungry for change and believe in our promise to make life affordable again,” he said.

Atiku said his candidacy was national, not limited to Northern Nigeria, adding that hunger and hardship affected citizens across regional and ethnic boundaries throughout Nigeria.

“My roots are in Northern Nigeria, but my candidacy belongs to all Nigerians. There is a difference between being from the North and being a candidate only for the North.

“The timing of this judgment is no coincidence. It is part of a strategy to weaken my support in the North and frustrate a campaign whose message is resonating across the country,” Atiku said.

The former vice-president also questioned the legal basis for reopening the leadership dispute, citing an earlier judgment by Justice Musa Liman of the Federal High Court.

He said that Liman had dismissed the challenge to the Mark-led leadership in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1637/2025 and upheld objections on jurisdiction, standing and exhaustion of internal remedies.

“Why, after that judgment, was another case filed to reopen the same dispute? This is a calculated attempt to circumvent a subsisting judgment,” he added.

Atiku said the party would challenge the judgment at the Court of Appeal and urged supporters to remain calm, peaceful and law-abiding amid tensions.

He also urged supporters not to allow the judgment to undermine the momentum generated in Sokoto, saying that the campaign train was already in Kebbi and would continue.

Atiku urged supporters to remain resolute, take the campaign message from house to house and door to door, and remain peaceful and focused.

According to him, there is no shaking.

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Why Court nullified Mark-led ADC Leadership, invalidated Atiku’s Candidacy

The Federal High Court in Abuja on Thursday nullified the leadership of the African Democratic Congress (ADC) led by David Mark.

Justice Peter Lifu, in a judgment, also invalidated all decisions taken by the party under the Mark-led leadership, including the May 25 presidential election in which former Vice President Atiku Abubakar won.

Justice Lifu declared as illegal the Mark-led interim National Working Committee (NWC).

The judge agreed with Nafiu-Bala Gombe, the ADC’s aggrieved National Deputy Chairman, North-East, of ADC, that the emergence of Mark, Aregbesola and other interim NWC members as party’s leaders breached the provisions of the party’s constitution and the Electoral Act.

Gombe had, in the suit, argued that following the resignation of former National Chairman of the party, Ralph Nwosu, he was constitutionally entitled to take over the party’s leadership.

He consequently asked the court to invalidate all actions taken by the Mark-led leadership and restrain Mark and Rauf Aregbesola, the National Secretary, and other members of their caretaker committee, from parading themselves as valid leaders of the party.

The plaintiff maintained that their emergence violated the ADC constitution and relevant provisions of the Electoral Act.

The suit, marked FHC/ABJ/CS/1819/2025, listed the ADC, Independent National Electoral Commission, Mark, Aregbesola and Nwosu as 1st to 5th defendants respectively.

However, Mark, Aregbesola and others disagreed with Gombe, urging the court to dismiss the suit on the grounds that, as at the time Nwosu resigned, Gombe was no longer a deputy national chairman of the party.

Delivering the judgment, Justice Lifu examined the propriety of the argument.

“I shall first consider the alleged resignation because it forms a substantial part of the defendants’ contention that the plaintiff (Gombe) had relinquished his office before the events complained of.

“The plaintiff denies the signature appearing on Exhibit ADC-1 and the forwarding letter, Exhibit ADC-2, and maintains that they do not bear his authentic signature.

“The 1st defendant argues that the certified copy of the resignation letter is documentary evidence which ought to be preferred to the plaintiff’s denial.

“The fact that a document is certified, however, does not, by that fact alone, settle a genuine dispute as to whether the person named in it, actually signed it.

“Certification may establish the status of the copy as a true copy of the document in the custody of the certifying authority; it does not necessarily establish the authenticity of the disputed signature.

“The court must therefore consider the document alongside the other relevant evidence,” he said.

Citing a previous case, the judge said the Court of Appeal affirmed the power of a trial court to compare a disputed signature or handwriting with a signature or handwriting admitted or otherwise established to be that of the person concerned.

Also citing the 2016 case of Mobil Producing (Nig.) Ltd vs Hope, he said the Court of Appeal, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Adenle v. Olude (2002), emphasised the duty of the court to undertake the necessary comparison of disputed and admitted signatures before reaching a reasonable conclusion.

Justice Lifu therefore said that the court was not bound to accept the disputed signature merely because it appeared on a certified copy, nor was expert evidence invariably indispensable, before the court could consider the question of authenticity.

“I am mindful that an allegation of forgery is serious and that the burden and standard of proof applicable to such an allegation must be observed.

“The court must not declare the signature forged merely pecause the plaintiff denies it; neither should it conclude that the plaintiff resigned merely because the defendants tendered the letter.

“The question is whether, upon considering the available specimens, the circumstances surrounding the alleged resignation, and the totality of the evidence, the alleged resignation has been established to the standard required by law.

“In the absence of a satisfactory evidential basis for treating Exhibit ADC-1 as the plaintiff’s act, it cannot safely be relied upon as conclusive proof that he voluntarily relinquished his office.

“I therefore reject the proposition that the mere production or certification of Exhibit ADC-1, without resolving the genuine dispute as to its authorship, conclusively determines the question of resignation,” he ruled.

On the constitution of the new ADC leadership, the judge said Section 223(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution requires the constitution and rules of a political party to provide for the periodical election on democratic basis of its principal officers, and members of its executive committee or other governing body.

He said Section 228(a) empowers the National Assembly to make laws prescribing guidelines and rules to ensure internal democracy within political parties.

“In furtherance of that constitutional framework, Section 82(1) of the Electoral Act, 2022, requires a registered political party to give INEC at least 21 days’ notice of a convention, congress conference or meeting convened for, among other things, electing members of its executive committee or other governing body.

“Section 82(3) further requires such elections to be conducted democratically, allowing all members or duly elected delegates to vote for the candidates of their choice,” he said.

The judge said Section 82(5) prescribes invalidity where the notice required by subsection (1) had not been given.

“The provisions must be read together. The requirement to notify INEC and the requirement of democratic election are related but distinct obligations.

“Evidence that INEC received 25 days’ notice and monitored the 99th NEC meeting may be relevant to compliance with the notice requirement; it does not, without more, establish that the officers who emerged were democratically elected.

“Equally, the fact that INEC monitored the meeting and subsequently recognised the outcome cannot by itself validate a process that is otherwise inconsistent with a mandatory constitutional or statutory requirement,” he said.

Justice Lifu said though he acknowledged that political parties possess autonomy to regulate their intemal affairs under their constitutions, he said nevertheless, the exercise of those powers remains subject to the constitution and applicable legislation.

“A party’s constitution cannot be interpreted or applied so as to displace the mandatory requirement of democratic elections imposed by Section 223(1}(a) of the Constitution and Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act, where the relevant statutory conditions apply.”

According to the him, the material question is therefore not simply whether the NEC had power to convene, deliberate or take administrative decisions.

“It is whether the particular process by which the 2nd and 3rd defendants (Mark and Aregbesola) emerged complied with the applicable legal requirements.

“The plaintiff relies on Exhibits NBG-4, NBG-5, NBG-6, NBG-7 and NBG-8 to contend that no democratic election or voting by members or duly elected delegates took place at the 99th NEC meeting.

“The defendants relied on Exhibits ADC-6 and ADC-8, among other documents, to establish notice, monitoring and the decisions taken at the meeting.

“Having considered the competing positions, I find that the fact of notice to and monitoring by INEC cannot substitute for proof of democratic election where the law requires such an election.”

He said though Gombe stated that he was the only elected NWC member who had not resigned at the time Nwosu relinquished his position who ought to be acting national chairman, the judge said this had to be proven in line with the relevant provisions of the party’s constitution and their application to the facts.

He said though the courts are generally cautious not to interfere in purely internal political party matters, the judge said “where the complains raises a justiciable question concerning compliance with an express constitutional or statutory obligation, the court must determine that question by reference to the applicable law and the evidence before it.”

He said in the instant case, Gombe had specifically challenged the emergence of Mark and Aregbesola on the ground that they were appointed or ratified at the 99th NEC meeting held on July 29, 2025 without a democratic election.

“The plaintiff relies, among other documents, on Exhibits NBG-5 and NBG-8 in support of his contention that the process did not involve an election or voting by members or duly elected delegates.

“The defendants, for their part, rely substantially on the powers of the NEC under the Ist defendant’s constitution, the notice allegedly given to INEC and the fact that the commission monitored the meeting and subsequently recognised its outcome.

“Having considered the respective positions of the parties and the documentary evidence placed before this court, there is no evidence before the court establishing that the emergence of the 2nd and 3rd defendants (Mark and Aregbesola) was preceded by, or resulted from, a democratic election conducted in accordance with Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act, 2022,” he said.

“Before I conclude on this issue, I have carefully compared the signature appearing on Exhibit ADC-1, purportedly the plaintiff’s resignation letter, with the signatures appearing on the various witness statements on oath deposed to by the plaintiff in this suit.

“Upon a close examination and comparison of these signatures in line with the decisions of the courts earlier provided, I find that they are materially different and cannot reasonably be regarded as one and the same signature.

“This comparison is particularly relevant because the witness statements on oath of the plaintiff provide signatures against which the disputed signature may be assessed.

“Although Exhibit ADC-1 was tendered by the defendants as documentary evidence of the plaintiff’s alleged resignation, its production and certification do not, in themselves, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff actually authored or signed it.

“In the circumstances, and having considered the disputed document alongside the signatures on the plaintiff’s witness statements on oath, I am not satisfied that Exhibit ADC-1 represents the genuine act of the plaintiff.

“I therefore reject it as reliable proof that the plaintiff voluntarity resigned from his position as Deputy National Chairman of the 1st defendant (ADC).

“Accordingly, Exhibit ADC-1 is hereby held not to constitute a valid or established resignation letter of the plaintiff and the defendants cannot rely on it to establish that he relinquished his office before the events giving rise to this suit. I so hold.

“Consequently, I find that the emergence of the 2nd and 3rd defendants as national officers of the 1st defendant at the 99th NEC meeting of 29th July, 2025 has not been shown to satisfy the mandatory requirement of democratic election under Section 82(3) of the Electoral Act, 2022.

“The decisions and acts founded upon that process, in so far as they depend upon the validity of their emergence as officers, cannot be sustained merely on the strength of the NEC’s general powers or INEC’s subsequent recognition.

“The plaintiff’s challenge therefore succeeds on this substantive point. I so hold.

“Finally, I have considered the 3rd defendant (Aregbesola)’s counterclaim, including the contention that the plaintiff failed to renew his party membership and did not exhaust internal dispute-resolution mechanisms, as well as the claim for costs.

“The counterclaim must stand on the evidence and legal grounds advanced in its support.

“The assertion that the plaintiff failed to comply with internal party requirements which I have earlier deposed off in this judgment, without adequate proof and consideration of the legal effect of those requirements, establish an independent entitlement to the declaratory reliefs sought.

“Nor does the mere failure of a party’s claim automatically entitle a counterclaimant to all the reliefs claimed.

“In the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that the 3rd defendant has established a sufficient basis for the substantive declaratory reliefs sought by way of counterclaim.

“For these reasons, I resolve the substantive questions in favour of the plaintiff to the extent that the constitution of party leadership remains subject to the mandatory requirements of the constitution and the Electoral Act, and that INEC’s monitoring or recognition cannot cure a demonstrated failure to comply with those requirements,” the judge ruled.

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Africa’s Energy Bank: Can It Turn African Ownership into Public Value?

The Africa Energy Bank has crossed a milestone that eluded it for years. On 31 October, the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the African Petroleum Producers’ Organisation (APPO) formally announced its establishment at an inaugural general meeting in Abuja. Helmy Ghazi was named its first president, and the institution’s board was constituted. The headline figure is US$5 billion in authorised capital. 

That is significant progress. But authorised capital is not money ready to lend. It is the amount an institution is permitted to issue under its capital structure. It does not tell us how much shareholders have subscribed or paid in, or how much the Bank can currently deploy.

Before the formal establishment, APPO’s secretary-general told S&P Global Energy that the Bank expected to begin with about US$500 million available for deployment, with financing decisions anticipated in 2027. That was an earlier estimate, not a reconciliation of the US$5 billion figure. The current paid-in and deployable amounts remain undisclosed. 

The central question is therefore not only how much capital the Bank can raise. It is this: when the Bank takes risks that commercial lenders will not, how will it prove that the public benefits are worth the exposure borne by African shareholders and governments?

That question goes to the heart of the Bank’s promise. It is meant to finance energy projects that may struggle to attract conventional capital. But public or shareholder-backed risk is justified only when the project’s benefits, financing terms and risk allocation are clear.

The financing need is real, but not uniform

Africa’s energy investment needs are substantial, but they do not amount to one undifferentiated funding gap. The International Energy Agency’s 2025 analysis found significant regional imbalances: North and South Africa account for a disproportionate share of energy investment and installed electricity capacity, while much of sub-Saharan Africa remains short of reliable power. Private investment in African clean energy rose to almost US$40 billion in 2024, while public and development finance for energy stood at about US$20 billion. 

The needs also differ by project. An oilfield, cross-border gas pipeline, refinery upgrade, transmission line and clean-cooking business face different risks, timelines and revenue prospects.

The IEA’s analysis of electricity access illustrates the gap that a large headline can obscure. Private finance for access projects reached only US$640 million in 2023, or 25% of total commitments. Equity investment remained concentrated in mature companies and markets, leaving smaller businesses and early-stage projects struggling to scale. 

A bank with a broad energy mandate could help address some of these needs. But a wide mandate is not an investment strategy. The Bank will need to explain which projects it will prioritise, how it will balance commercial returns against development benefits, and how it will work alongside existing African and international lenders.

When is public risk justified?

An African-led lender could respond to high financing costs with longer tenors, local knowledge, guarantees, co-financing or a greater willingness to take defined risks. The OECD estimated the weighted average cost of capital for infrastructure projects at about 13% in Africa, compared with 10% in developing Asia and 8% in OECD economies. It cautioned that data limitations may mean these estimates understate the challenge. 

But African ownership alone does not make a financing decision additional or worthwhile. The Bank must show that it is enabling projects that would otherwise not proceed, improving their terms, or generating greater development value than the financing available elsewhere.

Some projects may merit support even when they are not commercially attractive on their own. Transmission and energy-access infrastructure, for example, can deliver broad public benefits but offer limited short-term returns. A development bank can reasonably finance them. It should, however, disclose why public or concessional support is justified, what outcomes are expected and who bears the risk if the project underperforms.

For each significant investment, the market and the public should be able to see four things: the capital actually available; why the project could not proceed on comparable terms without the Bank; how financial and other risks are shared; and what measurable energy and development outcomes are expected.

This is not a demand that every project must guarantee success. Infrastructure investment is inherently uncertain. It is a demand that risk be assessed and allocated transparently, rather than described as “strategic” and left unexplained.

If a project fails, the losses do not vanish. They may fall on the Bank, its shareholders, governments or ultimately taxpayers. That exposure is not automatically improper; it depends on the Bank’s legal and financial structure. But it must be visible before financing is approved, not rationalised after a loss.

A scorecard for the Bank

The next phase should be judged against evidence: how much capital has been subscribed and paid in; what amount is available for financing; what lending and risk policies govern decisions; and whether private or institutional co-financiers join its transactions.

The Bank should also disclose how it selects projects, whether smaller and locally owned developers can participate, and how it measures outcomes such as dependable supply, access, productive use and regional trade. Over time, portfolio performance should show whether its risk-sharing model is financially sustainable. The projects it declines to finance will be revealing too.

Afreximbank and APPO bring institutional experience and a regional platform. That gives the Bank a credible foundation, not a guarantee of success. Its impact will depend on whether it can mobilise additional capital, take risks that produce demonstrable public value and account clearly for who benefits and who bears the exposure.

The Africa Energy Bank has been established. The real test is not whether it can announce a large capital figure, but whether it can show, transaction by transaction, that the public benefits justify the risks African institutions are taking.

Sola Adebawo is an energy industry executive, strategic advisor and thought leader with nearly three decades of experience across Nigeria’s upstream petroleum sector. He is the Chief Executive Officer of Hyphen Partners Limited, a specialist advisory firm focused on policy and regulatory intelligence, market entry, stakeholder strategy, executive and institutional positioning in complex and highly regulated industries. A former executive at Chevron and Heritage Energy, he is an author, scholar and ordained minister. His writing explores energy policy, political economy, corporate governance, strategic communication, leadership, the relationship between institutions and public life, as well as the institutional forces shaping Africa’s development.